The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value
AbstractThis paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 67 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Other versions of this item:
- Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2010. "The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value," NBER Working Papers 16574, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vicente Cunat & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2010. "The Vote is cast: The effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value," FMG Discussion Papers dp663, Financial Markets Group.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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