Task Assignment and Agency Structures
AbstractThis paper considers an agency model in which a principal delegates an agent authority to choose investment projects. The performance of the project depends stochastically on the agent's evaluation and operating efforts. The paper examines the conditions under which the principal prefers to assign production to a second agent. It is shown that the tasks will be assigned to two agents if the agent chooses an unobservable operating effort. The tasks will be assigned to one agent if the agent's evaluation and operating efforts are both unobservable and if disutilities of efforts are large relative to the profit from the risky project. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 2 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
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- Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011.
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