IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jacrfn/v31y2019i2p92-104.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Chitru S. Fernando
  • Vahap B. Uysal
  • Amal P. Abeysekera

Abstract

In summarizing the findings of their recent study, the authors report findings that suggest that not all socially responsible corporate policies are likely to have the same effect on a company's ownership and value. Using environmental policy as their proxy for CSR activities, the authors classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (1) actions that reduce the likelihood of harmful outcomes by reducing the corporate exposure to environmental risk; and (2) actions that enhance companies' perceived ‘greenness’ through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Although both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially beneficial, corporate expenditures that reduce a firm's environmental risk exposure are more likely to benefit shareholders by limiting the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, and fines—and possibly thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. By contrast, corporate expenditures that enhance the firm's perceived greenness by going beyond legal requirements and risk management rationales could actually reduce shareholder value. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that institutional investors tend to own smaller than average percentages of both companies the authors identify as ‘toxic’ and make limited efforts to manage their environmental risk, and companies they label ‘green’ with low environmental risk exposure but relatively high CSR spending on the environment. At the same time, such investors hold larger‐than‐average positions in ‘neutral’ companies with relatively low, or effectively managed, environmental risk exposures and limited investment in ‘greenness’ programs. The authors also find that both toxic and green companies have lower (Tobin's Q) valuations than neutral companies, and that otherwise toxic companies that effectively manage their environmental risk exposures have higher valuations.

Suggested Citation

  • Chitru S. Fernando & Vahap B. Uysal & Amal P. Abeysekera, 2019. "An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 31(2), pages 92-104, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:31:y:2019:i:2:p:92-104
    DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12351
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12351
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jacf.12351?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42, January.
    2. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Institutional Investors and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 229-259.
    3. Mark P. Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, 2008. "Environmental risk management and the cost of capital," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(6), pages 569-592, June.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    5. Del Guercio, Diane, 1996. "The distorting effect of the prudent-man laws on institutional equity investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 31-62, January.
    6. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    7. Willard T. Carleton & James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1335-1362, August.
    8. Yaniv Grinstein & Roni Michaely, 2005. "Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1426, June.
    9. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    10. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
    11. Franklin Allen & Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, 2000. "A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2499-2536, December.
    12. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr & Wehrly, Eric W, 2005. "The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 653-675, October.
    13. Galema, Rients & Plantinga, Auke & Scholtens, Bert, 2008. "The stocks at stake: Return and risk in socially responsible investment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2646-2654, December.
    14. Alexander Kempf & Peer Osthoff, 2007. "The Effect of Socially Responsible Investing on Portfolio Performance," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 13(5), pages 908-922, November.
    15. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    16. Laura T. Starks, 2009. "EFA Keynote Speech: “Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do Investors Care about? What Should Investors Care about?”," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 44(4), pages 461-468, November.
    17. Sudheer Chava, 2014. "Environmental Externalities and Cost of Capital," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(9), pages 2223-2247, September.
    18. Hong, Harrison & Kacperczyk, Marcin, 2009. "The price of sin: The effects of social norms on markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 15-36, July.
    19. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Terry, Rory L., 1994. "Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-390, June.
    20. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    21. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    22. Smith, Michael P, 1996. "Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence for CalPERS," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 227-252, March.
    23. Ekkehart Boehmer & Eric K. Kelley, 2009. "Institutional Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(9), pages 3563-3594, September.
    24. Kempf, Alexander & Osthoff, Peer, 2007. "The effect of socially responsible investing on portfolio performance," CFR Working Papers 06-10, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yifan Liu & Leyuan You, 2023. "Does the market reward firms for being more green or less brown?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 47(3), pages 564-585, September.
    2. Dumitrescu, Ariadna & Zakriya, Mohammed, 2021. "Stakeholders and the stock price crash risk: What matters in corporate social performance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fernando, Chitru S. & Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A., 2012. "Institutional ownership, analyst following, and share prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2175-2189.
    2. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Marcus, Alan J. & Saunders, Anthony & Tehranian, Hassan, 2007. "The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1771-1794, June.
    3. Fernando, Chitru S. & Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A., 2010. "Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following and Share Prices," Working Papers 10-07, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    4. Parrino, Robert & Sias, Richard W. & Starks, Laura T., 2003. "Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 3-46, April.
    5. Loureiro, Gilberto & Makhija, Anil K. & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Why Do Some CEOs Work for a One-Dollary Salary?," Working Paper Series 2011-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    6. Sheng-Syan Chen & Robin K. Chou & Yun-Chi Lee, 2020. "The effects of executive compensation and outside monitoring on firms’ pre-repurchase disclosure behavior and post-repurchase performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 111-158, January.
    7. Chung, Chune Young & Wang, Kainan, 2014. "Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 203-233.
    8. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    9. Krüger, Philipp, 2015. "Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 304-329.
    10. Low, Angie & Makhija, Anil K. & Sanders, Anthony B., 2007. "The Impact of Shareholder Power on Bondholders: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Working Paper Series 2007-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    11. Jiang, George J. & Liu, Chang, 2021. "Getting on board: The monitoring effect of institutional directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    12. Golbe, Devra L. & Nyman, Ingmar, 2013. "How do share repurchases affect ownership concentration?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 22-40.
    13. Ming-Feng Hsu & Kehluh Wang, 2014. "The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2S), pages 159-173, March.
    14. Abeysekera, Amal P. & Fernando, Chitru S., 2020. "Corporate social responsibility versus corporate shareholder responsibility: A family firm perspective," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    15. Chen, Xia & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2007. "Monitoring: Which institutions matter?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 279-305, November.
    16. Brook, Yaron & Hendershott, Robert J. & Lee, Darrell, 2000. "Corporate governance and recent consolidation in the banking industry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 141-164, July.
    17. Chung, Chune Young & Hur, Seok-Kyun & Liu, Chang, 2019. "Institutional investors and cost stickiness: Theory and evidence," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 336-350.
    18. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "The State of Corporate Governance Research," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 325-346, Springer.
    19. Lily Qiu, 2005. "Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers 2005-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    20. Klein, April, 1998. "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 275-303, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:31:y:2019:i:2:p:92-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1078-1196 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.