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Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games

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  • Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
  • Frédéric Dufourt

Abstract

Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of theNash equilibriumconcept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The International Society for Economic Theory in its journal International Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 75-94

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:3:y:2007:i:2:p:75-94

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References

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  1. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
  2. d'ASPREMONT, C. & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, R. & GÉRARD-VARET, L.-A., . "On the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1211, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Claude D’Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 2000. "Contestability and the Indeterminacy of Free-Entry Equilibria," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 72-83, 03.
  4. Weitzman, Martin L, 1982. "Increasing Returns and the Foundations of Unemployment Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 787-804, December.
  5. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Competition for market share or for market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying competitive toughness," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1973, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Corchon, Luis C. & Fradera, Isabel, 2002. "Comparative statics in Cournot free entry equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 155-168, November.
  7. Brock, William A, 1983. "Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1055-66, December.
  8. Novshek, William, 1980. "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 473-86, April.
  9. Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Dufourt, Frederic, 2006. "Free entry and business cycles under the influence of animal spirits," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 311-328, March.
  10. Makoto Yano, 2006. "A price competition game under free entry," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 395-414, October.
  11. Franco Modigliani, 1958. "New Developments on the Oligopoly Front," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 215.
  12. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  13. Georg Götz, 2005. "Market Size, Technology Choice, and the Existence of Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 503-, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Germán Coloma, 2009. "El número óptimo de empresas bajo competencia de Bertrand," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 397, Universidad del CEMA.
  2. Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Lloyd-Braga, Teresa, 2003. "Business Cycles with Free Entry Ruled by Animal Spirits," CEPR Discussion Papers 3919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Frédéric Dufourt, 2013. "On stabilization policy in sunspot-driven oligopolistic economies," Working Papers hal-00789233, HAL.

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