In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of ?rms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers? rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and ?rms sales and pro?ts, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory framework where wages are not controlled.
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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number
08-09.
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