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When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

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  • Michele Fabrizi
  • Xing Huan
  • Antonio Parbonetti

Abstract

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.

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  • Michele Fabrizi & Xing Huan & Antonio Parbonetti, 2021. "When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 157-178, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:56:y:2021:i:1:p:157-178
    DOI: 10.1111/fire.12240
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    2. Xing Huan & Gary John Previts & Antonio Parbonetti, 2023. "Understanding the LIBOR scandal: the historical, the ethical, and the technological," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(4), pages 403-419, December.

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