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Water markets in Australia: an experimental analysis of alternative market mechanisms

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  • John G. Tisdell

Abstract

Formal water markets in Australia began as uniform price open call markets. As water markets in Australia continue to expand and mature, water managers are introducing double auction water markets, believing that such markets will produce more efficient outcomes. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative merits of the two auction mechanisms in context. To date, experimental comparisons of these auction mechanisms have been based on balanced, single unit designs with defined buyers and sellers. However, many resource markets involve trade in multiple unit, often thin, double auction markets. This paper questions whether a multiple unit double auction performs as well as the more traditional open multiple unit call auction in a series of thin water market experiments.
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  • John G. Tisdell, 2011. "Water markets in Australia: an experimental analysis of alternative market mechanisms," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 55(4), pages 500-517, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:55:y:2011:i:4:p:500-517
    DOI: j.1467-8489.2011.00550.x
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    1. James Murphy & Ariel Dinar & Richard Howitt & Steven Rassenti & Vernon Smith, 2000. "The Design of ``Smart'' Water Market Institutions Using Laboratory Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(4), pages 375-394, December.
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    3. Randall, Alan, 1981. "Property Entitlements And Pricing Policies For A Maturing Water Economy," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 25(3), pages 1-26, December.
    4. McCabe, Kevin A & Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L, 1992. "Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch the Best?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 9-23, January.
    5. Plott, Charles R. & Gray, Peter, 1990. "The multiple unit double auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 245-258, March.
    6. Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Price formation in double auction markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1307-1337, August.
    7. Alan Randall, 1981. "Property Entitlements And Pricing Policies For A Maturing Water Economy," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 25(3), pages 195-220, December.
    8. Smith, Vernon L, et al, 1982. "Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 58-77, March.
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    1. Tanaka, Kenta & Higashida, Keisaku & Managi, Shunsuke, 2014. "A laboratory assessment of the choice of vessel size under individual transferable quota regimes," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 58(3), July.
    2. Seidl, Constantin & Wheeler, Sarah Ann & Zuo, Alec, 2020. "High turbidity: Water valuation and accounting in the Murray-Darling Basin," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    3. Yi Liu & Peng Li & Zhiwei Zhang, 2018. "Resilient or Not: A Comparative Case Study of Ten Local Water Markets in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-16, November.
    4. Broadbent, Craig D. & Brookshire, David S. & Coursey, Don & Tidwell, Vince, 2014. "An experimental analysis of water leasing markets focusing on the agricultural sector," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 88-98.
    5. Sinner, Jim & Fenemor, Andrew & Anastasiadis, Simon, 2012. "Mixed bag: Simulating market-based instruments for water quality and quantity in the Upper Waikato," 2012 Conference, August 31, 2012, Nelson, New Zealand 160054, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    6. Vollaro, M. & Zavalloni, M. & Raggi, M. & Viaggi, D., 2013. "Potential for water use right market development in Italy: social acceptability in the context of climate change," 2013 Second Congress, June 6-7, 2013, Parma, Italy 149912, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).
    7. Craig D. Broadbent & David S. Brookshire & Don Coursey & Vince Tidwell, 2017. "Futures Contracts in Water Leasing: An Experimental Analysis Using Basin Characteristics of the Rio Grande, NM," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 569-594, November.

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