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Towards Explaining the Cause of PPP as a Dangerous Diversion of Meager Resources in Lesotho

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  • Thuso Donald Mosabala

    (Pan African University in Cameroon, Yaoundé)

Abstract

The article examines the greatly marketed Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a means towards realizing solutions on the protracted health challenges in the Kingdom of Lesotho. It is premised on the idea that while there may be differing views on the appropriateness and inappropriateness of the PPPs in Lesotho, what remains an issue of concern is the decision to invest in an arrangement that the country has little or no experience in, especially on the health sector. To further explain this particular problem, the paper employs three theoretical approaches to analyze Lesotho’s decision to invest in the PPP. This article is motivated by the question, what led to the Lesotho PPP in the form of Queen ‘Mamohato Memorial Hospital being considered a dangerous diversion of the Ministry of Health meagre resources? As a point of departure, the conceptualization of PPP is explored. The article will proceed to provide a background on the PPP in Lesotho, theoretical approaches as well as touching on the literature and general implications of the model in Lesotho.

Suggested Citation

  • Thuso Donald Mosabala, 2020. "Towards Explaining the Cause of PPP as a Dangerous Diversion of Meager Resources in Lesotho," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 4(6), pages 606-611, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcp:journl:v:4:y:2020:i:6:p:606-611
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