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Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures

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  • Nuppenau, Ernst-August
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    Abstract

    Political procedures aimed at solving conflicts are becoming popular in agri-environmental economics. They are considered as substitutes for market trans­ac­tions. Ecological lobbying groups put pressure on poli­ticians to enforce ecological main structures, while farmers oppose them. Undefined property rights pose problems and statutory regulations are discussed. The paper applies a political economy model of social bargaining to the provision of an ecological main structure. It shows how a tragedy of the commons problem may prevail. Then it outlines a social optimum of field margin provision. Finally, it provides a solution to the establishment of socially acceptable rules in a political economy framework. Also, a payment scheme is introduced.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Greek Association of Agricultural Economists in its journal Agricultural Economics Review.

    Volume (Year): 01 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:ags:aergaa:26413

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    Web page: http://www.etagro.gr/
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    Keywords: Political Economy;

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    1. Bartsch, Elga & Thomas, Ingo & Rauscher, Michael, 1993. "Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities," Kiel Working Papers 562, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Rausser, Gordon C., 1992. "Predatory Versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies," Staff General Research Papers 724, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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