IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v8y1994i3p61-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Two Improvements on the Clinton Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Peter A. Diamond

Abstract

Under the Clinton proposal, states choose a single payer or large regional alliances, where individuals choose from all plans in the market. This should give the high administrative costs of individual choice, not those of group choice. States should have another option--small alliances offering limited, group-based choice. Clinton proposes comprehensive insurance for all, with courts enforcing coverage for all medically necessary services not explicitly excluded. Covered services are not coordinated with resources available. Eventually, rationing will be needed. Less comprehensive basic coverage is an additional tool for rationing and decreases the government's role in determining health spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter A. Diamond, 1994. "Two Improvements on the Clinton Framework," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 61-66, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:3:p:61-66
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.3.61
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.8.3.61
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Diamond, 1993. "Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile," NBER Working Papers 4510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-1254, November.
    3. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kim Sébastien Pham, 1996. "La réforme du système de santé américain : entre assurance et solidarité," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 71-85.
    2. James, Harvey S., Jr., 2007. "A New Institutional Economics Perspective on the Relationship Among Societal Values, Governance Structure and Access to Rural Health Care Services," Working Papers 7362, University of Missouri Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Bahram Adrangi & Kambiz Raffiee, 1997. "An econometric analysis of health care reform in the U.S," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 3(2), pages 181-192, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1997. "Systèmes mixtes d'assurance maladie, équité, gestion du risque et maîtrise des coûts," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 189-205.
    2. Trottmann, Maria & Zweifel, Peter & Beck, Konstantin, 2012. "Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: Which is more effective?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 231-242.
    3. Sverre Grepperud, 2005. "Medical Errors: Mandatory Reporting, Voluntary Reporting, or Both?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 99-112, July.
    4. Seungchul Lee & Robert Rosenman, 2013. "Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals’ Market Share," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 503-518, December.
    5. Izabela Jelovac & Philippe Polomé, 2017. "Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(12), pages 319-331, December.
    6. Ching‐To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, March.
    7. Schmitz, Hendrik, 2013. "Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians – The effect of a remuneration system reform on health care utilisation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1240-1249.
    8. James M. Malcomson, 2005. "Supplier Discretion Over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 412-429, Summer.
    9. Braendle, Thomas & Colombier, Carsten, 2020. "Budgetary targets as cost-containment measure in the Swiss healthcare system? Lessons from abroad," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(6), pages 605-614.
    10. M. Antonini & R. C. van Kleef & J. Henriquez & F. Paolucci, 2023. "Can risk rating increase the ability of voluntary deductibles to reduce moral hazard?," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(1), pages 130-156, January.
    11. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, March.
    12. Miller, Nolan, 2004. "Market Structure, Commitment, and Treatment Incentives in Health Care," Working Paper Series rwp04-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Adolf Kwadzo Dzampe & Shingo Takahashi, 2024. "Financial incentives and health provider behaviour: Evidence from a capitation policy in Ghana," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(2), pages 333-344, February.
    14. Schneider, Pia, 2005. "Trust in micro-health insurance: an exploratory study in Rwanda," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 61(7), pages 1430-1438, October.
    15. Fengrong Liu & Jiayu Chen & Chaozhu Li & Fenghui Xu, 2023. "Cost Sharing and Cost Shifting Mechanisms under a per Diem Payment System in a County of China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(3), pages 1-12, January.
    16. Franz Benstetter & Achim Wambach, 2001. "Strategic Interaction in the Market for Physician Services: The Treadmill Effect in a Fixed Budget System," CESifo Working Paper Series 427, CESifo.
    17. Olivella, Pau & Siciliani, Luigi, 2017. "Reputational concerns with altruistic providers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-13.
    18. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2011. "Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1011-1019.
    19. Peter Diamond, 1993. "Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile," NBER Working Papers 4510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Kifmann, Mathias, 1997. "To commit or not to commit: A health insurance monopoly with variable quality and uncertain types of individuals," Discussion Papers, Series I 288, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:3:p:61-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.