The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
AbstractThis paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our Committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based "scramble" to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information and other design issues that may arise in the market for new economists.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 24 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Other versions of this item:
- Coles, Peter Andrew & Cawley, John & Levine, Phillip B. & Roth, Alvin E. & Siegfried, John J. & Niederle, Muriel, 2010. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Scholarly Articles 5343168, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007.
"Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions,"
NBER Working Papers
13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
- Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 199-219, August.
- Carmit Segal, 2006. "Motivation, test scores and economic success," Economics Working Papers 1124, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2008.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2006.
"Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
12702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
- Alexey Kushnir, 2010.
"Harmful signaling in matching markets,"
IEW - Working Papers
509, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Krause, Annabelle & Rinne, Ulf & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2011.
"Anonymous Job Applications of Fresh Ph.D. Economists,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6100, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Krause, Annabelle & Rinne, Ulf & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2012. "Anonymous job applications of fresh Ph.D. economists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 441-444.
- Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2010.
"Preference Signaling in Matching Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
16185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ajay Agrawal & John Horton & Nico Lacetera & Elizabeth Lyons, 2013.
"Digitization and the Contract Labor Market: A Research Agenda,"
in: Economics of Digitization
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ajay Agrawal & John Horton & Nicola Lacetera & Elizabeth Lyons, 2013. "Digitization and the Contract Labor Market: A Research Agenda," NBER Working Papers 19525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria & Antonella Tutino & Anton Cheremukhin, 2013. "A Theory of Targeted Search," 2013 Meeting Papers 664, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Peter Coles & Ran Shorrer, 2013. "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2010. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions," NBER Working Papers 16556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.