Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
AbstractWe document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dehejia, Rajeev, 2013. "The porous dialectic: Experimental and non-experimental methods in development economics," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Guilhem Cassan, 2012.
"Identity based policies and identity manipulation: evidence from Colonial Punjab,"
1214, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Cassan, Guilhem, 2013. "Identity Based Policies and Identity Manipulation: Evidence from Colonial Punjab," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1306, CEPREMAP.
- Javier E. Baez & Adriana Camacho & Emily Conover & Román A. Zárate, 2012.
"Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior,"
010312, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Baez, Javier E. & Camacho, Adriana & Conover, Emily & Zarate, Roman A., 2012. "Conditional cash transfers, political participation, and voting behavior," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6215, The World Bank.
- Baez, Javier E. & Camacho, Adriana & Conover, Emily & Zárate, Román Andrés, 2012. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 6870, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2012.
Working Paper Series
rwp12-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Sarah Baird & Craig McIntosh & Berk Ã–zler, 2011.
"The Regressive Demands of Demand-Driven Development,"
2011-21, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
- Baird, Sarah & McIntosh, Craig & Özler, Berk, 2013. "The regressive demands of demand-driven development," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 27-41.
- Baird, Sarah & McIntosh, Craig & Ozler, Berk, 2011. "The regressive demands of demand-driven development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5883, The World Bank.
- Adriana Camacho & Emily Conover & Alejandro Hoyos, 2009.
"Effects of Colombia's Social Protection System on Workers' Choice between Formal and Informal Employment,"
006003, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Camacho, Adriana & Conover, Emily & Hoyos, Alejandro, 2013. "Effects of Colombia's social protection system on workers'choice between formal and informal employment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6564, The World Bank.
- Emmanuel Saez, 1999.
"Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?,"
NBER Working Papers
7366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.