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Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size

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  • Kei Kawakami

Abstract

We analyze the welfare implications of information aggregation in a trading model where traders have both idiosyncratic endowment risk and asymmetric information about security payoffs. The optimal market size balances two forces: (i) the risk-sharing role of markets, which creates a positive externality amongst traders, against (ii) the information-aggregation role of prices, which leads to prices that are more correlated with security payoffs, thereby undermining the hedging function of markets. Our analysis indicates that a market with infinitely many traders may not be the right welfare benchmark in the presence of risk aversion and information aggregation.

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  • Kei Kawakami, 2017. "Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 303-323, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:303-23
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160010
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    Cited by:

    1. Babus, Ana & Parlatore, Cecilia, 2022. "Strategic fragmented markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 876-908.
    2. Colin von Negenborn, 2023. "The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 603-634, September.
    3. Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2021. "Exchange Design and Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2887-2928, November.
    4. Arnold, Lutz G. & Zelzner, Sebastian, 2022. "Financial trading versus entrepreneurship: Competition for talent and negative feedback effects," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 186-199.
    5. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2021. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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