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Hyper-Rational Choice in Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Gholamreza Askari
  • Madjid Eshaghi Gordji

    (Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Iran)

  • Manuel De la sen

    (Institute of Research and Development of Processes IIDP, Faculty of science and technology, University of the Basque country, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper, a new interpretation of the rationality for modeling in the game theory has been proposed. The advantage of this concept emphasizes the importance of outcomes of other actors in game. The hyper-rationality concept focuses on preferences of actors how seek to maximize benefit or loss of other actors and or seek to maximize his benefit

Suggested Citation

  • Gholamreza Askari & Madjid Eshaghi Gordji & Manuel De la sen, 2019. "Hyper-Rational Choice in Game Theory," Biostatistics and Biometrics Open Access Journal, Juniper Publishers Inc., vol. 9(2), pages 45-46, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:adp:jbboaj:v:9:y:2019:i:2:p:45-46
    DOI: 10.19080/BBOAJ.2019.09.555760
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-72945-7, March.
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