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Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Tang, Rui & Zhang, Mu, 2021. "Maxmin implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  2. Shafer, Rachel C., 2020. "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 281-287.
  3. Takashi Ui, 2023. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Papers 2303.12263, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  4. Ui, Takashi, 2025. "Strategic ambiguity in global games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 65-81.
  5. Liu, Zhiwei & Song, Xinxi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2020. "Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-11.
  6. Kocherlakota, Narayana R. & Song, Yangwei, 2019. "Public goods with ambiguity in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 218-246.
  7. William A. Barnett & Kangzheng Ding, 2024. "Expected Utility Maximization Under Weakened Assumptions Consistent With Behavioral Economics," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 202418, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
  8. Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
  9. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022. "Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 167-181, May.
  10. Huiyi Guo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022. "Incentive compatibility under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 565-593, April.
  11. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2019. "Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces," Papers 1910.12516, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
  12. Shaowei Ke & Qi Zhang, 2020. "Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1159-1195, May.
  13. Ziyuan Sun & Man Wang & Weiwei Zhang & Yanli Li & Dan Wang & Feng Dong, 2019. "How Can We Improve the Transformation Success Rate of Research Results in the Pharmaceutical Industry? The Game Theoretic Model of Technology Transfer Subjects," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(9), pages 1-30, May.
  14. Guo, Huiyi, 2024. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 263-284.
  15. Edwards, Robert A. & Routledge, Robert R., 2022. "Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
  16. Lang, Matthias & Wasser, Cédric, 0. "Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  17. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 801-833, October.
  18. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  19. Song, Yangwei, 2023. "Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 56-87.
  20. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
  21. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2021. "On stochastic independence under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 925-960, April.
  22. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  23. Auster, Sarah & Kellner, Christian, 2022. "Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  24. Matt Essen & John Wooders, 2020. "Dissolving a partnership securely," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(2), pages 415-434, March.
  25. Yangwei Song, 2025. "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(2), pages 245-279, June.
  26. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  27. Pintér, Miklós, 2022. "How to make ambiguous strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
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