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Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lucia Gibilaro & Gianluca Mattarocci, 2021. "Financial Distress and Information Sharing: Evidences from the Italian Credit Register," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(5), pages 1-12, May.
  2. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Choo, Lawrence & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2021. "Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
  3. Hubert J. Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2022. "Experimental bank runs," Chapters, in: Sascha Füllbrunn & Ernan Haruvy (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Finance, chapter 25, pages 347-361, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Hubert J. Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2021. "Experimental Bank Runs," ThE Papers 21/03, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  4. Jinzhi Lu, 2022. "Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 60(5), pages 1991-2027, December.
  5. Flora Muiño & Marco Trombetta, 2009. "Does graph disclosure bias reduce the cost of equity capital?," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(2), pages 83-102.
  6. Beverly R. Walther, 2004. "Discussion of Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 197-205, May.
  7. Yousef Alwardat, 2019. "Disclosure Quality and its Impact on Financial Reporting Quality, Audit Quality, and Investors’ Perceptions of the Quality of Financial Reporting: A Literature Review," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 8(3), pages 201-201, August.
  8. Hong Qu, 2013. "How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 51(5), pages 1221-1260, December.
  9. W. Brooke Elliott & Susan D. Krische & Mark E. Peecher, 2010. "Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 48(2), pages 343-381, May.
  10. Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  11. George Iatridis & Panayotis Alexakis, 2012. "Evidence of voluntary accounting disclosures in the Athens Stock Market," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 11(1), pages 73-92, February.
  12. Pingyang Gao, 2008. "Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(4), pages 785-807, September.
  13. Sanjay Banerjee & Michael Maier, 2016. "Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 54(4), pages 941-986, September.
  14. Anctil, Regina M. & Dickhaut, John & Johnson, Cathleen & Kanodia, Chandra, 2010. "Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 228-241, November.
  15. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 61-77, March.
  16. Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 12-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  17. Konstantinos Georgalos & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2020. "Nash versus coarse correlation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1178-1204, December.
  18. Yung, Kenneth & Cai, Qiuye & Li, Deqing Diane, 2023. "Greasing the wheels of irreversible investment: International evidence on the economic effects of corruption," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  19. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
  20. Carlos Corona & Lin Nan & Gaoqing Zhang, 2019. "The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 57(5), pages 1161-1200, December.
  21. Steven J. Bosworth, 2017. "The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 237-258, March.
  22. Hassan, Omaima A.G. & Romilly, Peter & Giorgioni, Gianluigi & Power, David, 2009. "The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 79-102, March.
  23. Reajmin Sultana, 2021. "Family ownership, information problem and firm performance," International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 73-82, September.
  24. Michał Baran & Kinga Bauer, 2021. "The Role of Information in Assessing the Risk of Conducting Bankruptcy Proceedings," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-18, April.
  25. Georgalos, Konstantinos & Ray, Indrajit & Gupta, Sonali Sen, 2019. "Nash vs. Coarse Correlation," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2019/3, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  26. Wu, Junfeng & Liu, Baohua & Chang, Samuel & Chan, Kam C., 2022. "Effects of air pollution on accounting conservatism," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
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