IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wzbfff/spii2012106.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contracted government: Unveiling the European Commission's contracted staff

Author

Listed:
  • Murdoch, Zuzana
  • Trondal, Jarle

Abstract

Over the past two decades, reliance on short-term contracted staff has increased in government institutions across the Western world. This tendency towards contracted government may be strengthened during periods of economic and financial stress. This article therefore poses the following questions: First, does contracted government lead to civil servants less loyal and attentive to the concerns of their government institutions? Secondly, and more generally, what factors shape the behavioural perceptions of contracted government staff? Benefiting from a new, full-scale survey among seconded national experts in the European Commission, this study shows that contracted Commission staff are largely integrated and committed to the Commission and its administrative sub-units. The general lesson learned is that when under contract, contracted personnel seem mainly loyal and attentive to the concerns of the government institution under which they formally serve. This finding dispels fears that contracted government officials may serve several masters. Theoretically, the behavioural perceptions of contracted Commission officials are explained with reference to their primary organisational affiliation towards the Commission and its sub-units, as well as by the internal organisational composition of the Commission services.

Suggested Citation

  • Murdoch, Zuzana & Trondal, Jarle, 2012. "Contracted government: Unveiling the European Commission's contracted staff," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-106, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2012106
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/58348/1/717086356.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny, 2011. "Instrumental calculation, cognitive role-playing, or both? Self-perceptions of Seconded National Experts in the European Commission," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-110, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Hooghe, Liesbet, 2005. "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(04), pages 861-898, October.
    3. March, James G. & Olsen, Johan P., 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(04), pages 943-969, September.
    4. Morten Egeberg, Guenther F. Schaefer & Jarle Trondal, 2003. "The many faces of EU committee governance," ARENA Working Papers 2, ARENA.
    5. Morten Egeberg & Jarle Trondal, 1999. "Differentiated Integration in Europe: The Case of EEA Country, Norway," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 133-142, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contracted government; executive order; European Commission; seconded national expert; transformation;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2012106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/wzbbbde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.