IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Informationsaustausch und trotzdem Wettbewerb? Unternehmensverhalten bei Nachfrageunsicherheit


  • Hornig, Stephan O.


Unternehmen müssen nicht immer Kollusionsabsichten verfolgen, wenn sie untereinander Informationen austauschen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß bei Nachfrageunsicherheit auch strikt kompetitive Konkurrenten private Informationen bezüglich ihrer Nachfragebedingungen preisgeben. Dies läßt sich in einem allgemeinen heterogenen Oligopolmodell ableiten, auf dessen erster Stufe sich die Unternehmen für den optimalen Umfang des Informationsaustauschs entscheiden, um anschließend auf der zweiten Stufe oligopolistischen Wettbewerb zu betreiben. Im Bayesianischen Gleichgewicht resultieren eindeutige Gleichgewichtsstrategien. Diese sind durch die Art des auf dem betreffenden Markt herrschenden Wettbewerbs (Mengen- oder Preiswettbewerb) und durch die Eigenschaften der produzierten Güter (Substitute oder Komplemente) bestimmt.

Suggested Citation

  • Hornig, Stephan O., 1999. "Informationsaustausch und trotzdem Wettbewerb? Unternehmensverhalten bei Nachfrageunsicherheit," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 160, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:160

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Stadler, Manfred & Hornig, Stephan O., 2000. "Wettbewerb bei unvollständiger Information: Informationsaustausch oder stillschweigende Kollusion?," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 177, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Manfred Stadler & Rüdiger Wapler, 2004. "Endogenous Skilled-biased Technological Change and Matching Unemployment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, January.
    3. Stadler, Manfred, 2003. "Innovation and growth: The role of labor-force qualification," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 255, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.