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Network Access in the Deregulated European Electricity Market: Negotiated Third-Party Access vs. Single Buyer


  • Bier, Christoph


The question of third-party access to the networks has become central to the debate around the liberalisation of the European electricity markets due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the transmission network. The European Union?s electricity directive provides three institutional options for the organisation of network access: the single buyer procedure, the negotiated third-party access and the regulated third-party access. This paper analyses these regimes in a framework of an imperfect decision-making regulation authority which can commit errors when supervising the transmission tariffs. It will be shown that the equivalence of the systems required in the directive is usually not achieved. In addition, conditions for deciding between the three systems are derived under social welfare considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bier, Christoph, 1999. "Network Access in the Deregulated European Electricity Market: Negotiated Third-Party Access vs. Single Buyer," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 99-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9906

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1993. "Time, uncertainty, and subjectivism: Giving more body to law and economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 61-84, March.
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    More about this item


    Electricity Industry; Network Access; Imperfect Regulation Agency;

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law


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