Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox
We show that in a homogeneous-good duopoly market with quality uncertainty and constant unit costs, the Bertrand paradox (i.e., marginal cost pricing) can be avoided.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
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