Commitment in Environmental Policy as an Entry-Deterrence Tool
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KeywordsEntry deterrence; Emission fees; Perfect commitment;
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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