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Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures


  • Hammond, Peter J.

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)


A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a non-binary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals' preferences concern only their own personal consumption. This chapter begins by discussing which Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as competitive equilibria with lump-sum transfers. It also discusses existence and characterization of such equilibria without lump-sum transfers. The second half of the chapter focuses on continuum economies, for which such characterization results are much more natural given that agents have negligible influence over equilibrium prices.

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  • Hammond, Peter J., 2007. "Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 804, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:804

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Al-Najjar, Nabil Ibraheem, 1995. "Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1195-1224, September.
    2. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, 1999. "Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables: Corrigendum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 919-920, July.
    3. Hammond, Peter J. & Sun, Yeneng, 2007. "Monte Carlo Simulation of Macroeconomic Risk with a Continuum Agents : The General Case," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 803, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. P.J. Hammond, 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.

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