Asset Ownership and Investment Incentives Revisited
Previous work on the property rights theory of the firm suggests that in the presence of outside options, asset ownership may demotivate managers. This paper shows that this conclusion relies on the assumption that a manager's outside option only depends on her own investment.
|Date of creation:||2000|
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