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The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Frijters

    (Free University, Amsterdam)

  • Alexander F. Tieman

    (Free University, Amsterdam)

Abstract

In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of pre-commitment devices such as contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In a local interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient combined punishment potential have signalled their willingness to form such an authority, conditional upon the willigness of others to do so. Given a specific timing of decisions, we analyse the conditions under which authorities arise and under which they evolve into a stationary state with only one or several remaining authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Frijters & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities," Public Economics 9907005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9907005
    Note: Type of Document - Tex/Scientific Workplace 3.0; prepared on Compaq PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 41 ; figures: included
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    Keywords

    Central Authorities; Cooperation; Evolution; Externalities; Local Interaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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