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Selección de contribuyentes a fiscalizar

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pinedo

Abstract

Este ensayo es una aproximación a la manera eficiente de seleccionar al universo de contribuyentes y asi obtener la muestra ideal que nos permita tener resultados eficaces al momento de someterlos a una fiscalización, trata de determinar los indicadores microeconomicos más relevantes para optimizar el proceso de selección.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pinedo, 2005. "Selección de contribuyentes a fiscalizar," Public Economics 0512014, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0512014 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 34
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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/pe/papers/0512/0512014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    2. Vanberg, Viktor & Buchanan, James M, 1986. "Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-227, Fall.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:55:y:1961:i:04:p:831-842_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    5. Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2007. "Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 369-389, April.
    6. Teece, David J., 1980. "Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 223-247, September.
    7. Strumpf, Koleman S, 2002. " Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 207-241.
    8. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

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