IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Choice of The Optimum Fiscal Rule – The Long Run Perspective


  • Michal Mackiewicz

    (Institute of Economics, University of Lodz)


Paper examines the problem of choice of an optimal fiscal rule in the long run. An ideal rule would typically assure fair distribution of utility over generations, while allowing to maintain the sustainable fiscal position. Three commonly used types: debt, deficit and expenditure rules are considered. The main conclusion is that only the modified deficit rule fulfils the assumptions. The rule requires that government’s policy should aim at keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio constant over the economic cycle. The analysis is extended by taking into account the specific situation of the developing countries. An optimum fiscal constraint is then the Modified Golden Rule, according to which the public assets-to-GDP ratio should be held constant over the cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Mackiewicz, 2005. "Choice of The Optimum Fiscal Rule – The Long Run Perspective," Public Economics 0501007, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0501007
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Andreoni, James & Bergstrom, Ted, 1996. "Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(3-4), pages 295-308, September.
    2. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 299-308, February.
    3. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Sequential Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 89-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    4. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    5. James Andreoni, 2006. "Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, January.
    6. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
    7. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    9. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    10. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    11. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
    12. James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, 2003. "Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 792-812, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. David Prušvic, 2010. "Evropská fiskální pravidla a jejich účinnost: prvních 15 let
      [European Fiscal Policy Rules: First 15 Years]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(1), pages 51-69.

    More about this item


    fiscal rules; fiscal policy; long run;

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0501007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.