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Papieren wetgeving is geen panacee

Author

Listed:
  • Ralph de Haas

    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

Abstract

Review of the article "Law and Finance in Transition Economies", K. Pistor, M. Raiser and S. Gelfer, Economics of Transition, 2000, 8(2), pp. 325-368.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph de Haas, 2002. "Papieren wetgeving is geen panacee," Law and Economics 0209001, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0209001 Note: Type of Document - Word; prepared on PC; to print on HP;
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 777-795.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. White, William D., 1992. "Information and the control of agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 111-117, June.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    6. Fumas, Vincente Salas, 1993. "Incentives and supervision in hierarchies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 315-331, August.
    7. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 134-139.
    8. Cheung, Steven N S, 1983. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, April.
    9. Moore, John, 1992. "The firm as a collection of assets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 493-507, April.
    10. Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-161, Spring.
    11. Hirao, Yukiko, 1993. "Task Assignment and Agency Structures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 299-323, Summer.
    12. Valsecchi, Irene, 1996. "Policing Team Production through Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 361-375, October.
    13. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
    14. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 7-45.
    15. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    16. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 972-991.
    18. Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. "Principal And Agent," Papers 12, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    19. Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
    20. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. "The Logic of Economic Organization," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 65-93, Spring.
    21. Minkler, Alanson P., 1993. "Knowledge and internal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 17-30, May.
    22. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-198, Spring.
    23. James Jr., Harvey S., 1998. "Are employment and managerial control equivalent? Evidence from an electronics producer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 447-471, September.
    24. Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    law finance transition;

    JEL classification:

    • K - Law and Economics

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