Revenue Sharing, Conjectures, and Scarce Talent in a Model of a Professional Sports League
We develop a model of a representative professional sports club that has the option of adopting one of two different forms of revenue sharing: traditional revenue sharing and central pool type revenue sharing. To adopt either form of revenue sharing, the league requires that a majority of clubs increase profit with adoption of the plan. We derive necessary conditions for either plan to garner enough support for a majority vote. The likelihood of forming a majority on the conjectures on acquiring talent that clubs possess. Competitive conjectures make revenue sharing more likely, while cartel conjectures make revenue sharing less likely. Empirical results provide evidence in favor of the model for four North American professional sports leagues.
|Date of creation:||23 Mar 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - MSWord/pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 29 ; figures: included|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Rascher, 1997. "A model of a professional sports league," International Advances in Economic Research, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 3(3), pages 327-328, August.
- Palomino, Frederic & Rigotti, Luca, 2000.
"The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt2w3284jj, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Frederic Palomino & Luca Rigotti, 2001. "The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win," Industrial Organization 0012003, EconWPA.
- Palomino, F.A. & Rigotti, L., 2000. "The Sport League's Dilemma : Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win," Discussion Paper 2000-109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Frederic Palomino and Luca Rigotti., 2000. "The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win," Economics Working Papers E00-292, University of California at Berkeley.
- Stefan Kesenne, 2000.
"Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports,"
Journal of Sports Economics,
, vol. 1(1), pages 56-65, February.
- KÉSENNE, Stefan, . "Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports," Working Papers 1999019, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Peter J. Sloane, 2000. "The Regulation of Professional Team Sports," IASE Conference Papers 0003, International Association of Sports Economists.
- Daniel R. Marburger, 1997. "Gate Revenue Sharing And Luxury Taxes In Professional Sports," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 114-123, 04.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.