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Distributed Games

Listed author(s):
  • Dov Monderer


  • Moshe Tennenholtz


Registered author(s):

    The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by existing models in economics, artificial intelligence and game theory. New models are needed to deal with these multi-agent interactions. In this paper we present a new model--distributed games. In such a model each players controls a number of agents which participate in asynchronous parallel multi-agent interactions (games). The agents jointly and strategically control the level of information monitoring by broadcasting messages. As an application we show that the cooperative outcome of the Prisoners' Dilemma game can be obtained in equilibrium in such a setting.

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    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9707001.

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    Length: 7 pages
    Date of creation: 02 Jul 1997
    Date of revision: 13 Aug 1997
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707001
    Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on unix/AmsTex; to print on PostScript; pages: 7
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