IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Learning in Different Social Contests


  • Marco Novarese

    (Centre for Cognitive Economics)


This paper aims at analysing the effects of learning on the individual behaviour in an experiment that requires cooperation and coordination within teams. Using artificial agents, different social contests are created, as training environments. The results confirm previous findings (on the tendency to repeat the strategies that proved to be successful and to apply them also in other situations) and propose new hypothesis. Learning is not only based on a mechanical repetition of past choices, but also on reflection, imitation and on the attitude to build a model of the world. Besides the paper empirically tests the role of satisfaction in the routinization (this is one of the first empirical attempt of this kind). The training in an unfair and difficult environment leads some individuals to reinforce also strategies that have not been successful, but that involved emotions. Another contest seems not to determine detectable effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Novarese, 2004. "Learning in Different Social Contests," Game Theory and Information 0405008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405008
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22. Paper prepared for the Conference 'Cross-Fertilization Between Economics and Psychology', Sabe and Iarep joint meeting, Philadelphia, July, 2004 Session Number F1 “Cognitive Economics 1” A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the II Conference of the Italian Association for Cognitive Economics, held in Ivrea (To), March, 2004

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Learning; cognitive economics; experimental economics; cooperation; coordination; satisfaction;

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.