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Des conventions aux performances : pour un outil d’élaboration d’un accord - Toward an agreement


  • Paranque Bernard

    (Euromed Marseille Ecole de Management)


Dans un article d’octobre 2001, Jensen souligne les limites opérationnelles de la théorie de la maximisation de la valeur et de la théorie des parties prenantes (Stakeholder theory). La complémentarité entre ces théories vient de l’affirmation que le bien être collectif n’est atteint que si « toutes les valeurs » portées par chaque partie prenante sont prises en compte et que cette maximisation se fasse sur le long terme. Il y a donc la reconnaissance de la firme comme une organisation historique et complexe. Toutefois, il apparaît une difficulté opérationnelle dans la mesure où les objectifs des différentes parties prenantes non aucune raison d’être convergentes à priori. Cette critique vaut aussi bien du point de vue la maximisation de la valeur ( comment gérer plusieurs objectifs à la fois) que de celui de la théorie des parties prenantes ( comment définir un objectif commun). Le présent article tente d’apporter une contribution à cette exigence de coordination en proposant une démarche fondée par l’économie des conventions. In an article from October 2001, Jensen underlines the operational limits of interpretation/current use which is made of the maximization of the value and the stakeholder theory. The complementarity between both theories comes from the assertion by Jensen of the need for understanding that the social welfare is then reached only if, on the one hand, "all the values" carried by each recipient are taken into account, and on the other hand, that this maximization is done on the long term. There is thus the recognition of the firm as a historical and complex organization. However, it presents an operational difficulty. We can agree with the maximization of value as a way for the social welfare. However, we still have the problem of the non convergence a priori of the objectives of the differents stakeholders, including shareholders and managers. This criticism could be made for both theories. The present paper propose a contribution on the way to build the necessary « agreement » between stakeholder, based on the « économie des conventions » (salais).

Suggested Citation

  • Paranque Bernard, 2004. "Des conventions aux performances : pour un outil d’élaboration d’un accord - Toward an agreement," Finance 0402019, EconWPA, revised 16 Oct 2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0402019 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8 . paper in french, ref 2004- 02

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Fabozzi, Frank J & Francis, Jack C, 1979. "Mutual Fund Systematic Risk for Bull and Bear Markets: An Empirical Examination," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 34(5), pages 1243-1250, December.
    2. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
    3. Grinblatt, Mark & Titman, Sheridan & Wermers, Russ, 1995. "Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1088-1105, December.
    4. Stephen J. Brown, 2001. "Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(5), pages 1869-1886, October.
    5. Fung, William & Hsieh, David A., 2000. "Performance Characteristics of Hedge Funds and Commodity Funds: Natural vs. Spurious Biases," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(03), pages 291-307, September.
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    More about this item


    agreement; shareholder; stakholder; convention;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance


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