IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/stanec/98011.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Subjective Game Form and Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiko Aoki

Abstract

September 1998 The major purpose of this lecture is to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the mechanism of institutional evolution as "punctuated equilibrium." Section 1 introduces reasons why an equilibrium view of institutions may be appropriate. Section 2 introduces a simple apparatus, called the COSE box, to represent the structure of the game. Section 3 then provides an equilibrium-related conception of institutions satisfying the four observed features: summary representation, continuity, multiplicity, and common knowledge. Section 4 drops the assumption of fixedness of agents choices sets in classical and evolutionary game theories and introduces the notion of subjective game forms. By discussing how the agents revise own subjective game forms in response to external shocks in a correlated manner, it attempts to describe a possible mechanism of institutional change. Section 5 deals with two important objective mechanisms for selecting new institutions: institutional complementarity and embeddedness. Section 6 provides some examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 1998. "The Subjective Game Form and Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibrium," Working Papers 98011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:98011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp98011.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Philippe Colin, 2002. "Contrats agraires ou conventions agraires ?," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 272(1), pages 57-73.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:98011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/destaus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.