Dynamics of Games: Aggregate Stability and Individual Learning Rules
The study of learning in games encompasses two research lines: (1) explaining the aggregate stability of classes of games when players use inductive reasoning, and (2) explaining the learning rules used by actual players. We mix approaches by considering both stability and learning rules in terms of a partition of the strategy space, where changes to the partition structure imply changes in the stability characteristics of the game. We present experimental results from a set of three-person games and find that: (1) stability is a function of the characteristic of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, and (2) since different learning rules imply different stability characteristics, we can empirically separate two important classes of learning rules, finding evidence of belief learning rather than performance-based learning in our subjects.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||May 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501|
Web page: http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/working-papers.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:safire:97-05-041e. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.