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Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

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  • Guido Friebel

Abstract

The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade‐off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992–93.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guido Friebel, 1998. "Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 177, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:1998-177
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    Cited by:

    1. John Marangos, 2002. "A post Keynesian critique of privatization policies in transition economies," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 573-589.
    2. Berkowitz, Daniel & Holland, Jonathan, 2001. "Does privatization enhance or deter small enterprise formation?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 53-60, December.

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