IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the measurement of solvency of insurance companies : recent developments that will alter methodsadopted in emerging markets


  • Craig Thorburn


Solvency-both as an economic requirement in the market and as a regulatory and supervisory tool-is critical to all insurance markets. Current market conditions, coupled with expected institutional changes, will place particular burdens on emerging and developing markets. Institutional solvency, effective risk management within companies, effective supervisory oversight, and the development of market disciplines are all linked. The author proposes that the effective implementation of the emerging regime needs a careful and diligent phased process of capacity-building. The first priorities are identified as a strong supervisor, a basic solvency margin requirement, and the initiation of efforts to gather appropriate data sets. This can be followed by advancing development of more sophisticated solvency regulation, increased use of technical expertise, and increased use of market disciplines as the community and financial markets become more able to exercise such discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig Thorburn, 2004. "On the measurement of solvency of insurance companies : recent developments that will alter methodsadopted in emerging markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3199, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3199

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. repec:wsi:wschap:9789814569156_0009 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Gawande, Kishore, 1997. "Generated regressors in linear and nonlinear models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 119-126, February.
    6. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    7. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
    8. Olivier Cadot & Jaime de Melo & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2015. "The Protectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks: Evidence from Mercosur," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Developing Countries in the World Economy, chapter 15, pages 359-380 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
    10. Dickins, William T, 1990. "Error Components in Grouped Data: Is It Ever Worth Weighting?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(2), pages 328-333, May.
    11. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "“Protection For Sale” In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 9, pages 163-174 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Greg Brunner & Pablo Gottret & Birgit Hansl & Vijayasekar Kalavakonda & Somil Nagpal & Nicole Tapay, 2012. "Private Voluntary Health Insurance : Consumer Protection and Prudential Regulation," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13093.


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.