Analyzing financial sectors in transition : with special reference to the Former Soviet Union

This paper proposes a framework for analyzing the evolution of financial sectors in economies transiting from command to market structures. Most commentators have tended to regard this"Transition"as an undifferentiated period to be traversed as rapidly as possible. In doing so they ignore the increasing evidence that the Transition can be an extended, even enduring, state of the world, resulting from a complex interaction of economic, political, cultural and psychological factors. As such, it can and does generate incentives which fundamentally distort the behavior of economic agents in unpredictable ways. The authors argue that one result of ignoring the true messiness of the Transition is that the analysis and policy recommendations offered to governments can be flawed and often provide conclusions which are odds with the reality on the ground. The paper discusses this concern and proposes a simple analytical framework both for focusing on the Transition itself and also for use in defining and evaluating possible public policy interventions for the banking sector. This paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches the main shortcomings of the traditional analyses of the financial sector in transition - particularly the limitations of current thinking on the sequencing of financial sector reforms. Section III introduces and elaborates on the basic framework proposed. Section IV uses the framework to distill some simple but important propositions about transition banking. Section V provides an initial qualitative test of the framework, by using it as a lens through which to view some of the characteristics of transition banks which we have observed. It shows that behavior patterns which, at first glance, seem curious and counterproductive, do indeed have a rational explanation when viewed in relation to the analytical framework we propose. Section VI applies the proposed analytical approach to assess the appropriateness of various interventions -- especially those which have proved popular in the World Bank -- to support the financial sector transition. Two Annexes then elaborate particular aspects of the analysis. Annex 1 assesses how our analysis might recondition thinking about the appropriate regulatory and supervisory structures for transition banking. Annex 2 provides some initial empirical results based on our proposed framework of analysis.