The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment
This paper analyzes the effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Sanctions are punitive benefits reductions that are supposed to make recipients comply with certain minimum requirements concerning search behavior. We use a unique set of administrative micro data covering the whole population of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. To deal with the selectivity of the occurrence of a sanction we simultaneously model the process by which unemployed get a sanction and the process by which they find jobs. We exploit the fact that some respondents experience multiple spells.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.feweb.vu.nl|
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