A Note on the Non-existence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor-Model
It is shown that in a credit market with two types of borrowers, distinguished only through their not commonly known probability of default, and with a perfectly elastic supply of deposits, a pair of contracts with random rationing of less risky loan applicants cannot be a Nash-equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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|Date of creation:||Jan 1990|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published in International Economic Review|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl|
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