Free Riders and Cooperators in Public Goods Experiments: Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain their Coexistence?
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KeywordsFree Riding; Strong Reciprocity; Altruism; Nonstrategic Punishment; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
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