Mediators as the Walrasian Auctioneers of Exchange Theory
This article opens up mediation to systematic economic analysis by considering mediators as analogous to the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory. By altering trade-off rates among bargaining issues, mediators facilitate a process leading towards Pareto efficient voluntary settlements.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://apec.usu.edu/Email: |
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