Marginal Deterrence, Escalating Penalties and Enforcement Inconsistency
The Law and Economics literature on public law enforcement has generally treated separately the issue of marginal deterrence from that of punishing repeated offenders though escalating penalties. We extend the model provided by Emons (2003) to show how pursuing both policies may generate an inconsistent enforcement design.
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