IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Una modelización de los años de vida ajustados por la calidad como utilidades esperadas


  • José M. Abellán
  • José L. Pinto


En el presente trabajo, los a\~nos de vida ajustados por la calidad (AVAC), son caracterizados como funciones de utilidad von Newman--Morgenstern. Esta caracterizaci\'on se efect\'ua para dos problemas de elecci\'on: la elecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de salud cr\'onicos y la elecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de salud temporales. En el primer caso, deducimos las mismas condiciones que Pliskin et al. (1980), s\'olo que siguiendo un camino m\'as directo. En el segundo caso, una vez establecida una condici\'on de independencia aditiva basada en Fishburn (1970), inferimos una nueva condici\'on en la literatura sobre AVAC que denominamos \underline{condici\'on de simetr{\'\i}a}.

Suggested Citation

  • José M. Abellán & José L. Pinto, 1997. "Una modelización de los años de vida ajustados por la calidad como utilidades esperadas," Economics Working Papers 218, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:218

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: Whole Paper
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
    5. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
    6. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
    7. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
    8. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    9. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
    10. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    QALYs; expected utility; medical decision making;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.