Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises
We examine how Russian enterprises do business with one another, focusing on the strategies used to obtain efficiency and predictability in their transactions. Using survey data, the paper analyzes the relative importance of relational contracting, self-enforcement, enterprise networks, private security firms, administrative institutions, and courts. Enterprise-to-enterprise negotiations are preferred, but courts are used when disputes resist resolution through negotiation. Consistently, little evidence suggests enterprises resort to private enforcement, indicating overstatement in the supposed connection between weakness in law and the mafia's rise. Legacies of the old administrative enforcement mechanisms are few, although enterprise networks from Soviet days remain resilient.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742|
Web page: http://www.econ.umd.edu/
|Order Information:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742|
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