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Inicios de la protección a los trabajadores desempleados en Uruguay 1904-1958): la jubilación por despido


  • Nicolás Bonino Gayoso

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Ulises García Repetto

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)


Protection of unemployed workers constituted a subject of concern in the Uruguayan politic agenda already in the early 20th century. The problem was tried to be solved basically through three instruments: retirement by dismissal (“jubilación por despido”) and unemployment insurance, directed to protect from non-seasonal unemployment,and funds for unemployment compensation, directed to seasonal unemployment. During the first half of the 20th century the instrument applied was the retirement by dismissal. This working paper investigates the characteristics of this instrument and its performance, both in terms of unemployed’s protection and with respect to the funds´ finances. The study is based in data, reports and statements collected from the parliamentary sessions acts, messages that yearly the Executive sends to Legislative, and bulletins and yearbooks from the pensions funds.It arises from the investigation that this retirement benefit ended up distorted as a result of problems of design, organization and application. It also had negative effects on the funds´ finances. Several measures were taken in order to solve the problem, the main of them being the so-called unemployment subsidy. However, this tool also ended up distorted. It would have to wait until 1958 so that Uruguay had a system of compulsory unemployment insurance that protected unemployed workers in a more consistent way.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolás Bonino Gayoso & Ulises García Repetto, 2012. "Inicios de la protección a los trabajadores desempleados en Uruguay 1904-1958): la jubilación por despido," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-24, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-24-12

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolás Bonino-Gayoso & Ulises Garcia Repetto, 2015. "Seguro de paro y protección a los desempleados en Uruguay (1958-2014): legislación y desempeño," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 15-16, Instituto de Economía - IECON.

    More about this item


    Unemployment insurance; social security; unemployment; social public expenditure; public finances;

    JEL classification:

    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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