Endogenous Leadership in a Coordination Game with Conflict of Interest and Asymmetric Information
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KeywordsCoordination game; Conflict of interest; leadership;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-09-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2009-09-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-09-26 (Game Theory)
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