On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games
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KeywordsStable sets; Voting game; Convexity.;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-09-26 (Game Theory)
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