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On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games


  • Francesco Ciardiello



I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.

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  • Francesco Ciardiello, 2009. "On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games," Quaderni DSEMS 16-2009, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  • Handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:16-2009

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    Stable sets; Voting game; Convexity.;

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