On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games
I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.dsems.unifg.it
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:16-2009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Grilli)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.