On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games
I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
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