IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ufg/qdsems/03-2009.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Farsighted Stable Sets

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Ciardiello

    ()

  • Andrea Di Liddo

    ()

Abstract

A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place after the first move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a farsighted behaviour in his definition of large consistent set (LCS). In some respects, we propose a different idea of dominance relation based on indirect dominance and on a different concept of belief on moving coalitions' behavior. A notion of stability for a coalitional game is introduced by taking into account the different degree of risk/safety of any player participating in a move. Some results about uncovered sets, internal stability are investigated. By exploiting our dominance and stability concepts, the prisoner's dilemma in coalitional form and its Nash equilibrium are studied. Some examples illustrating the differences between the largest consistent set, our stable set and stable set due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Ciardiello & Andrea Di Liddo, 2009. "Farsighted Stable Sets," Quaderni DSEMS 03-2009, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  • Handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:03-2009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q032009.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adam Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(3), pages 591-611, March.
    2. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2011. "Largest Consistent Set in International Environmental Agreements," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 38(3), pages 407-423, October.
    3. Giovanni Villani & Marta Biancardi, 2011. "Largest Consistent Set in International Environmental Agreements," Quaderni DSEMS 04-2011, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:03-2009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Grilli). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/emsfoit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.