Nationalization of Energy Assets and Regional Welfare; Sakhalin 2007
Between 2001 and 2007, rising prices of oil and gas provided a gigantic domestic windfall for Russia’s government in the form of export duties and resource taxes. However, the windfall created incentives for the federal government to re-capture control rights to natural resource stocks. Thus, the past four years have seen a substantial transfer of effective ownership from private firms to government control. This study explores why multinationals were willing to commit billions of dollars of FDI to a remote Russian island in the North Pacific. It asks how the de facto re-nationalization of energy assets will impact the availability of advanced technologies, investment efficiency, and environmental risks to the North Pacific fishery.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2007-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Goldblatt)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.