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Justice at What Cost? Penalties, Rape Deterrence, and the Incentive to Murder

Author

Listed:
  • Radhika Bansal

    (University of California Riverside)

  • Ugo Antonio Troiano

    (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside)

Abstract

Increasing the penalties for a serious non-fatal crime can cost lives if the surviving victims serve as witnesses to secure the perpetrator’s conviction. In this article, we consider the case of laws against rape. We present a theoretical model to examine how increasing the penalty for one crime may lead the perpetrator to commit a collateral crime, thereby reducing the probability of conviction for the first crime. We then consider the cases of spousal rape laws and the mandatory minimum 25-year sentence for sex crimes against a child. Both treatments were introduced in the United States in a staggered fashion and increased the penalties for rape. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that abolishing spousal rape exemptions increased wife homicides by approximately 5 victims per state-year (27 percent), while mandatory 25-year minimum sentences for child sexual abuse increased child homicides by approximately 11 victims per state-year (80 percent).

Suggested Citation

  • Radhika Bansal & Ugo Antonio Troiano, 2025. "Justice at What Cost? Penalties, Rape Deterrence, and the Incentive to Murder," Working Papers 202516, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucr:wpaper:202516
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    File URL: https://economics.ucr.edu/repec/ucr/wpaper/202516.pdf
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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