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Paying More or Hassling Less? Experimental Evidence on Administrative Burdens, Incentives, and Grant Take-Up

Author

Listed:
  • Leonhard K. Lades
  • Glenn McNamara
  • Margaret Samahita

Abstract

Applying for benefits and programs can be so onerous that take-up is low even when support is crucial to people’s lives. This study investigates how administrative burden and financial incentives influence the quality of the completion of an administrative task using an incentivized real-effort task. The experiment, with a sample of 1002 UK participants, asked individuals to identify key information from hypothetical grant descriptions that varied in administrative complexity in order to complete an incentivized quiz for either a low or a high potential prize. Higher administrative burden significantly reduced the quality of the administrative task completion, while higher monetary incentives produced only modest improvements. These findings suggest that reducing administrative burden, rather than increasing financial incentives alone, may be a more effective way to improve administrative performance and increase take-up across grants, benefits, and similar programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonhard K. Lades & Glenn McNamara & Margaret Samahita, 2026. "Paying More or Hassling Less? Experimental Evidence on Administrative Burdens, Incentives, and Grant Take-Up," Working Papers 202608, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:202608
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/32465
    File Function: First version, 2026
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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